This is not a new variant, the disease it not airborne, and safety is utilizing standard precautions and proper PPE. Which, in the case of America and other Developed Nations, and as seen in the last month, is simple glove and gown protection.

Rather than look at du Pont—a company that has a vested interest in selling supplies—I think I’ll go with actual BSL-3 & -4 researchers. For example, Stephen Goldstein points out in The Atlantic that

In reality, the gold standard for clinical Ebola PPE, recommended by Doctors Without Borders and now the CDC, is something less than that. This entails full skin coverage with an impermeable gown or suit, use of a respirator to protect the worker during procedures like intubation, double gloves, and show covers. This all sounds a lot like what we wear to work with SARS or MERS, two viruses that require BSL-3 containment and procedures.

The specialized facilities we have to treat diseases like Ebola do reflect this. None of the hospitals that have safely treated Ebola patients, Emory, University of Nebraska, the NIH, or Bellevue have BSL-4 medical suites. What they have are contained-isolation rooms and the rigorous and careful use of BSL-3-like PPE by highly trained staff.

How Ebola is handled in laboratory research environments is a complete different thing than real-world scenarios. Please do your best to avoid propaganda by those who want to sell things, and instead rely on science.

Ebola is a BSL-4 biosafety hazard and a class A biowarfare agent. That is science, not speculation.

People who are using <BSL-4 appropriate (ie, substandard) protective gear should not consider themselves safe with respect to the ebola virus.

They maybe lucky, but they are rolling the dice.

The reality is that the WHO recommends sub-standard PPE so they don't scare or offens local populations who need to fight this disease under duress and in backcountry settings.

In other words, the WHO and (nov revised) "safety guidelines" are pure political propoganda on the front line of this disease.

Frankly, common Tyvek and similar (eg, 1441 type) fabrics may not really be appropriate without additional precautions. They are micro-porus its possible to wet them through under field-conditions.

The appropriate fabric is actually something else.
So, its safe to say this essay (however meaningful) is adjectly wrong both in its fundamental assumtions ("tyvek is overkill") and its conclusions as a result (Tyvek is actually not enough–you need something better).

(Pleas see du Pont's website if you doubt this).

Because the presumption that PPE makes people safer is, in a word, wrong. As a matter of fact, quite the opposite: repeated studies show us that people who use PPE who are not frequently using it and accustomed to it make more mistakes than those following basic barrier practice protocols.

Comfort for aid workers isn’t an issue in American hospitals, unless, of course, you think it’s common for American hospitals to not have basic HVAC equipment.

The difference in society—and yes, extreme poverty vs. one of the wealthiest nations on Earth—is extremely important when discussing Ebola. Pretending otherwise is ignorant; it’s up to you if it’s willful or not.

You are, of course, welcome to your opinion. Thirty-eight years of history, however, prove that opinions are not facts.

Actually, the CDC nurses were infected because they weren’t following the protocols suggested by the CDC. The new CDC protocols still are not the same as the ones used in Africa, so yes, my “viewpoint still holds merit,” in that it’s still correct.

Basic barrier control is all that’s needed to control an Ebola outbreak. It’s a pretty sad day when that’s difficult to achieve in America. (Then again, basic barrier control also involves other simple things we’ve been unable to get the majority of the medical community to consistently do,… like wash their hands.)